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Abstract
We present a Rational Speech Acts approach
to modeling how conversation participants
reason about perspectival expressions. The in-
terpretation of perspectival expressions, such
as the motion verbs come and go, depends
on the point-of-view from which they are
evaluated. In order to interpret a perspecti-
val expression, the listener must jointly rea-
son about the speaker’s intended message and
their choice of perspective. We propose a
Bayesian approach to this inference problem
and describe an extension of the Rational
Speech Acts model that incorporates perspec-
tive. We lay out three sets of predictions that
this model makes relating to the lexical se-
mantics of go, the cost of non-speaker per-
spectives, and marginal inference over worlds.
1 Introduction
Recent experimental and theoretical work at the
semantics/pragmatics interface has highlighted the
role of perspective. Perspectival expressions are
items whose meaning depends on the point-of-view
from which they are interpreted. A wide range of
linguistic phenomena appear sensitive to perspec-
tive, including spatial and temporal deictic expres-
sions like on the right and tomorrow (Speas, 2000);
pronouns (Loveland, 1984; Wechsler, 2010); mo-
tion verbs (Fillmore, 1975; Barlew, 2017); epithets
and expressives (Doron, 1991; Harris, 2012); and
logophors (Huang and Liu, 2001; Park, 2017).
⇤Many thanks to Lyn Frasier, Richard Futrell, and Jesse Har-
ris, and to our SCIL reviewers for their thoughtful feedback on
this work.
Perspectival items express two kinds of informa-
tion: their lexical meaning, and information about
the point-of-view adopted by the speaker. Consider
the sentence in (1), containing the perspectival mo-
tion verb come. Come describes motion relative to
the location of a perspective holder (Fillmore, 1975).
Thus (1) conveys information about the perspective
holder’s location in addition to its literal meaning
(that Thera is in motion to Northampton).
1. Thera is coming to Northampton in an hour.
In English,1 motion verbs like come and go al-
low at least three kinds of perspective holders: the
speaker (e.g. You are coming to my house), the lis-
tener (e.g. I am coming to your house), or the subject
of an attitude verb (e.g. Thera says I am coming to
her house). In order to understand who is located in
Northampton, however, the listener must infer who
the perspective holder is. How does she do this?
That is the central question that this paper addresses.
We propose to model the process of inferring a
perspective holder for a perspectival expression us-
ing the Rational Speech Acts model (RSA), a frame-
work for pragmatic modeling rooted in Bayesian
inference (Frank and Goodman, 2012; Goodman
and Stuhlmu¨ller, 2013). We extend the RSA to in-
clude the inference required to identify a perspec-
tive holder in context. In particular, we model the
interpretation of perspectival utterances as inference
over the joint probability of a world and a perspec-
tive given an utterance. We focus on one partic-
ular class of perspectival expressions, perspectival
1The set of licit perspective holders is a point of cross-
linguistic variation: see (Gathercole, 1987) and (Nakazawa,
2007; Nakazawa, 2009) for cross-linguistic work on the topic.
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motion verbs, and describe the model’s predictions
about some of the open questions related to these
verbs, including the lexical semantics of go and the
existence of a cost for non-speaker perspectives. In
what follows we describe the model and articulate
its key predictions. We hope that our model and its
predictions can guide further exploration of the role
of perspective at the semantics-pragmatics interface.
1.1 The semantics of come and go
Perspectival motion verbs are a good test case for
pragmatic modeling of perspective because there is
a rich literature on the topic that provides descriptive
facts to draw upon and open questions to test. We
adopt a view of the lexical semantics of come and
go rooted in the perspectival semantics for motion
verbs described in (Barlew, 2017). We use a lexical
semantics for come consisting of two components:
a motion implication, corresponding to the lexical
semantics of come, and an anchoring implication,
corresponding to the perspectival component, ex-
pressed in (2) in a simple event semantics.
2. Semantics of come:
For any world w, perspective a, destination d,
and entity x, [[Come(x, d)]]w,a = T iff
(a) Motion implication:
[[9e.Move(x, e) ^Dest(d, e)]]w,a = T
(b) Anchoring implication:
9y.[[Loc(y, d)]]w,a = T and y is a salient
perspective-holder with perspective a.
The motion implication is the literal meaning of
the sentence: that someone moves to the destina-
tion. The anchoring implication expresses that the
destination is the location of a perspective-holder.
We use a non-perspectival semantics for go: we
propose that it has only a motion implication.
3. Semantics of go:
For any world w, perspective a, destination d,
and entity x, [[Go(x, d)]]w,a = T iff
(a) Motion implication:
[[9e.Move(x, e) ^Dest(d, e)]]w,a = T.
There are a few key points about the meaning of
these motion verbs that any model must capture:
First, come requires that a salient perspective-
holder is located at the destination. This means
that come cannot be used to describe motion by the
perspective-holder. If this were not so, the speaker
would always be able to describe their own motion
with come, regardless of the destination.
4. Context: Matilda and Hildegard are having a
conversation in New York.
Matilda: I’ve always wanted to visit Antarctica,
but it’s so expensive.
Hildegard: I went / #came there last year. It
was so cool!
Second, the lexical semantics of come do not
directly specify the location of the speaker or the
listener, but rather the location of the perspective-
holder. Although the speaker of (1) (repeated as
(5)) may be the perspective-holder (as illustrated by
the speaker-oriented follow-up 5a, the listener also
could be (as in the listener-oriented follow-up (5b)).
5. Thera is coming to Northampton in an hour.
(a) I wish you could come hang out too!
(b) I wish I could come hang out too!
This means that the listener must successfully in-
fer the perspective-holder in order to determine the
interpretation of any sentence using come.
Third, although the lexical semantics of go pre-
sented here do not directly encode any anchoring im-
plication, in practice go seems to imply motion away
from the perspective holder. If (6) is interpreted
from the speaker’s perspective, then the listener will
infer that the speaker is not located in Northampton.
6. Thera is going to Northampton in an hour.
The source of this anti-anchoring implication is
debated. With the semantics proposed here, this im-
plication is derived via Gricean reasoning on the part
of the listener: if the perspective holder was located
in Northampton, then the speaker should have used
come; that she didn’t implies that the perspective
holder is not there (Wilkins and Hill, 1995; Sudo,
2018). However, in other theories, go has a perspec-
tival component (Fillmore, 1975; Oshima, 2006).
2 The pragmatics of conversations
2.1 Rational Speech Act
In his foundational work on pragmatics,
Lewis (1979) proposed that conversation is a
cooperative game between the participants, where
the goal is to determine which world the participants
are in. Participants work towards this goal by shar-
ing information, which narrows the set of possible
worlds that the real world might be. Information
shared between the conversation participants is
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stored in the Common Ground, which can be
viewed as the set of accepted propositions, or as the
worlds compatible with those propositions.
The Rational Speech Acts model is a framework
for pragmatic modeling that extends this picture by
proposing that the listener uses a Bayesian inference
process to determine what message the speaker is
trying to convey (Frank and Goodman, 2012). In
this model, the Common Ground contains not just a
set of worlds, but also a probability associated with
each world, the probability that it is the real world.
At each turn in the conversation, the speaker se-
lects a world from the set of worlds, simulating a
new piece of information that the speaker wishes
to contribute, and chooses an utterance to express
it. Upon hearing the speaker’s utterance, the lis-
tener must reason about the message that the speaker
is trying to convey. The listener assumes that the
speaker selects the sentence that maximizes the
probability of the observed world.
The listener interprets the sentence in order to up-
date the probability distribution over possible worlds
in the Common Ground, calculating the likelihood
of each world given the sentence selected, according
to their model of how the speaker picks sentences.
The Rational Speech Acts model is therefore re-
cursive. The listener’s model of the speaker is called
the literal speaker: the listener assumes that the
speaker estimates the utility of each sentence based
on a model of the listener, called the literal listener,
so called because it does not involve any pragmatic
reasoning. The literal listener is what the listener
imagines the speaker’s model of the listener to be.
The listener herself is called the pragmatic listener.
The Rational Speech Acts framework has been
applied to a range of phenomena, including projec-
tive content (Qing et al., 2016); politeness (Yoon et
al., 2016); scalar implicatures (Potts et al., 2016);
and word learning (Smith et al., 2013). Particularly
relevant to the model we propose is the RSA lexi-
cal uncertainty model, which models joint reasoning
over the lexicon and the speaker’s message (Bergen
et al., 2012; Kao et al., 2014; Bergen et al., 2016).
2.2 The standard RSA model
Although a RSA model is potentially infinitely re-
cursive, we discuss just three levels: the literal lis-
tener, literal speaker, and pragmatic listener.
For the literal listener, the posterior probability of
a world given an utterance is simply the literal mean-
ing of the utterance discounted by the prior proba-
bility of the world. The meaning of the utterance
is its denotation evaluated with respect to the world.
Thus, the interpretation function for an utterance is
an indicator function returning 1 or 0 depending on
whether the utterance is true of the world.
The literal speaker is the listener’s mental model
of the speaker. In this model, the speaker selects a
sentence in proportion to its utility, which is highest
for sentences that maximize the posterior probabil-
ity of the observed world according to the speaker’s
model of the listener (the literal listener).
The pragmatic listener is the model of the actual
listener. The listener reasons about the speaker’s
message according to their mental model of the
speaker (the literal speaker). The posterior proba-
bility over a world given the speaker’s utterance is
proportional to the likelihood of the literal speaker
selecting the utterance given the world, discounted
by the listener’s prior belief in the world.








where w = world,m = message
One other consideration is usually introduced into
the model: the cost of the utterance. This repre-
sents the trade-off between informativity and sen-
tence complexity: although the speaker could theo-
retically select an utterance that exactly isolates the
observed world, as the size of the set of possible
worlds increases, the complexity of this utterance
also increases. In practice, people often select a sim-
pler, less informative utterance rather than a maxi-
mally informative but more complex utterance. The
RSA model encodes this as a cost that penalizes the
utility for more complex utterances at the level of
the literal speaker, for some definition of complex-
ity. A common cost function is the length of the
sentence, although syntactic complexity or process-
ing complexity can also be considered.
There are three factors important in defining a
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RSA model: the set of possible worlds, the set of
utterances, and the priors over the worlds. Changes
to each of these affect the competition between ut-
terances and the outcome of the inference process.
In general, a uniform distribution over the possi-
ble worlds is used, simulating the empty Common
Ground at the beginning of a conversation.2
3 The pragmatics of perspective
What about perspectival expressions? In recent
work, Roberts (2015) proposes that the Common
Ground tracks a set of salient perspectives along
with the set of worlds. Perspectival expressions, like
come, are interpreted not just with respect to a world,
but also with respect to a perspective.
In this view, a perspective is a set of centered
worlds: a set of pairs consisting of a world in
which the perspective-holder’s beliefs are true and
the spatio-temporal slice of that world that the
perspective-holder self-identifies with (Stalnaker,
2014). Intuitively, a perspective can be seen as
a variable assignment that picks out the individual
in each world who the perspective-holder believes
themself to be. A perspectival expression is like an
expression with a free variable: it cannot be inter-
preted unless the perspective-holder is known.
If the Common Ground is used to track salient
perspectives as well as worlds, then the same in-
ference mechanisms that track the probabilities of
worlds in the Common Ground can be extended to
track the probabilities of the perspectives. Here we
propose just such an extension.
3.1 A perspectival extension to the RSA
We introduce the Perspectival Rational Speech Acts
model, which incorporates perspective into the RSA
framework. Building on Roberts (2015), we pro-
pose that conversation participants track probabili-
ties over the set of perspectives in order to reason
about the interpretation of sentences. As in the stan-
dard RSA model, the listener infers the probabil-
ity of the speaker’s message by reasoning about the
likelihood of each sentence given the message and
the prior probabilities over worlds. For perspecti-
2However, in actual conversations, the initial Common
Ground may include world knowledge that the speaker and lis-
tener have not explicitly mentioned, but are likely to agree upon.
val expressions, however, the listener must also in-
fer the probability of speaker adopting a certain per-
spective. Therefore, in the perspectival RSA, the
listener infers a joint probability: the probability
of a paired world and perspective given the utter-
ance. This models how listeners extract information
about both the speaker’s perspective and their mes-
sage from sentences containing perspectival items.
The Perspectival RSA model advances the hy-
pothesis that listeners interpret utterances not with
respect to a single perspective, but by considering
multiple perspectives simultaneously, each weighted
by its probability in context. In this, our model de-
parts from much previous work on the perspective
in discourse, which implicitly assumes that listeners
interpret utterances with respect to a single perspec-
tive (Harris, 2012; Kaiser, 2015; Roberts, 2015).
3.2 The perspectival RSA model
In the Perspectival RSA model, the literal listener
reasons about the probability of a world given the ut-
terance and the perspective. That is, in the speaker’s
model of the listener, the listener has access to the
chosen perspective. The posterior probability of the
world is proportional to the utterance’s truth value
with respect to the world and perspective, times the
prior probability of the world given the perspective.
8. Perspectival RSA model (preliminary)
(a) Literal listener:
L0(w|m, a) / [[m]]w,ap(w|a)
(b) Literal speaker:
S0(m|w, a) / softmax(logL0(w|m, a)  
Cost(m))3
(c) Pragmatic listener:
L1(w, a|m) / S0(m|w, a)p(w, a)
wherew = world,m =message, a = perspective
The literal speaker selects an utterance that maxi-
mizes the utility of the observed world according to
the speaker’s model of the listener, minus the cost of
the message (we return to this below). The speaker
observes a world, samples a perspective from the set
of perspectives, and selects an utterance accordingly.
The pragmatic listener calculates joint probabili-
ties for worlds and perspectives based on the utter-
ance that the speaker selects. The joint posterior they
3Thanks to Reviewer 1 for pointing out the need for the log
term.
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infer is proportional to the likelihood of the utter-
ance given the world and perspective, according to
the listener’s model of the speaker, times the prior
joint probability of the world and perspective.
3.3 Independence assumption
Above we showed that the inference in our model re-
lies on the joint prior over world / perspective pairs.
However, we make an independence assumption in
order to simplify the calculation and assume that the
prior probability of a world is independent of the
prior probability of the perspective.
9. Perspectival RSA model (intermediate)
(a) Literal listener:
L0(w|m, a) / [[m]]w,ap(w)
(b) Literal speaker:
S0(m|w, a) / softmax(logL0(w|m, a)  
Cost(m))
(c) Pragmatic listener:
L1(w, a|m) / S0(m|w, a)p(w)p(a)
wherew = world,m =message, a = perspective
3.4 The cost of a perspective
In addition to the utterance cost included in the stan-
dard RSA, we introduce a perspective cost. The
perspective cost function penalizes non-speaker per-
spectives.4 We use it to explore the idea that the
default perspective is that of the speaker. This idea
has been widely discussed in the previous literature
on perspective. In theoretical work, Roberts (2015)
posits that in the absence of explicit cues to the con-
trary, the listener always assumes that the speaker
is adopting their own perspective. In experimental
work, Harris (2012) and Kaiser (2015) find a strong
preference for interpreting expressives, epithets, and
other perspectival content from the speaker’s per-
spective, in the absence of explicit cues otherwise.5
10. Perspectival RSA model (final)
4We use this parameter instead of manipulating the priors
on perspectives because we intend to model effects of discourse
salience through the perspective priors in future work. The idea
is that as perspective holders are mentioned more frequently,
the probability of adopting their perspectives increases. By con-
trast, the cost of adopting non-speaker perspectives should re-
main fixed over a discourse, since it reflects the cognitive diffi-
culty in accomodating a non-speaker perspective.
5Note, however, that these experiments used written state-
ments where the listener was not explicit, unlike our contexts.
(a) Literal listener:
L0(w|m, a) / [[m]]w,ap(w)
(b) Literal speaker:
S0(m|w, a) / softmax(logL0(w|m, a)  
Cost(m)  Cost(a))
(c) Pragmatic listener:
L1(w, a|m) / S0(m|w, a)p(w)p(a)
wherew = world,m =message, a = perspective
In Section 5.2, we discuss the impact that this pa-
rameter has on the model’s predictions.
3.5 Probabilities over perspectives
One important part of our model is the set of
perspective holders that listeners track. In the
Roberts (2015) view of perspective, the speaker and
listener perspectives are automatically entered into
the Common Ground and attitude holder perspec-
tives are entered whenever an attitude verb is used.
Another possibility would be to introduce a new
perspective whenever a new entity possessing a
mental state is added to the Common Ground. We
plan to test the effect of different methods for intro-
ducing perspective holders in future work.
We adopt a uniform prior over perspective hold-
ers for the moment. However, exploring different
priors on perspectives might shed light on the topic
of perspective maintenance. There is experimen-
tal evidence that listeners prefer to posit a coher-
ent perspective over multiple utterances by the same
speaker (Harris, 2012). This Maintain Perspective
principle might be modeled well by a Dirichlet prior
on perspectives, which would lead to a gradual in-
crease in the probability of perspectives based on
how frequently they are adopted by the speaker.
4 An example
To explore the predictions of the perspectival RSA
model, we define toy sets of utterances and worlds.
4.1 Perspective holders
We consider a set of worlds with just three entities:
Sarah, the speaker; Lydia, the listener, and Thera, a
third party who is not involved in the conversation.
Although our model extends to attitude-holder
perspectives, we simplify our example by consider-
ing only the speaker and listener perspectives. We
adopt a uniform prior over the perspective set.
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Figure 1: Worlds and utterances (destination indicated by yellow box).
4.2 Worlds
We demonstrate our model with a small set of
worlds containing three individuals, Sarah, Lydia,
and Thera; and two locations: Northampton (Noho)
and Amherst. Since we are not considering Thera
in the perspective set, we omit Thera’s location. We
include just the worlds in which exactly one person
is moving, for a total of eight worlds (Fig.1). We use
a uniform prior distribution over the worlds.
4.3 Utterances
We consider two sentence frames: X is going to
Northampton and X is coming to Northampton,
where X represents any of the individuals, for a to-
tal of 6 utterances (Fig. 1). One of the uses of our
model is as a framework for testing the effects of dif-
ferent lexical semantics for come and go: we choose
the relatively simple denotations in Section 1.1 for
the sake of illustrating the model, but other seman-
tics for come and go could be substituted.
5 Model predictions
We implemented our model in the WebPPL pro-
gramming language (Goodman and Stuhlmu¨ller,
2014). Using the worlds and utterances described
above, we ran simulations to generate predic-
tions about the probabilities of world/perspective
pairs inferred by the listener. For each result re-
ported, we ran 100,000 iterations of Markov Chain
Monte Carlo sampling; we explored settings of
{0,0.25,0.5,0.75,1.0} for perspective cost.
Our key results are: (1) perspectival interpreta-
tions of go can arise through pragmatic competition
even if the lexical semantics of go are not perspecti-
val; (2) the likelihood of non-speaker perspectives
increases proportionally as the perspective cost is
decreased; and (3) listeners should favor worlds that
are consistent with multiple perspectives.
5.1 Competition between come and go
Our model shows how perspectival usage of go can
arise through pragmatic competition with come even
if the lexical semantics of go are not perspectival.
Wilkins and Hill (1995) posit that at least in some
languages, the interpretation of go as ‘motion away
from the perspective holder’ is not lexically en-
coded, but arises through pragmatic reasoning, and
Sudo (2018) proposes that Gricean reasoning is re-
sponsible for the interpretation of English go.
Our model verifies these theoretical proposals by
showing that the perspectival interpretation of go
can indeed arise solely through pragmatic compe-
tition with come. As shown in Fig. 2, our pragmatic
listener infers that for sentences with go, the per-
spectival holder is unlikely to be at the destination
of motion— even though our lexical semantics for
go are not perspectival.
For the go sentences, world / perspective pairs
where come is a viable alternative, such as when the
perspective holder is the listener and the listener is
at the destination of motion, are less likely than ones
where come is not a possible alternative.
Thus, even without a perspectival lexical seman-
tics, go acquires an interpretation that the perspec-
tive holder is unlikely to be at the destination.
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Figure 2: Model predictions for Thera is going to Northampton and Thera is coming to Northampton, speaker cost = 0.5
5.2 The cost of perspective shift
Another set of predictions relates to the perspective
cost parameter. As the cost for non-speaker perspec-
tives increases, the likelihood of a non-speaker per-
spective decreases. Because our cost function only
assigns cost to non-speaker perspectives, with a uni-
form prior over perspectives, a non-speaker perspec-
tive will only be more likely than the speaker per-
spective when the speaker perspective is excluded
by the lexical semantics of the sentence.
In our set of utterances, this occurs only with I am
coming to Northampton, where the speaker perspec-
tive is excluded by the lexical semantics of ‘come’,
since the speaker is moving (a person cannot be both
in motion and at the destination of motion). For this
sentence, the listener will infer with probability 1.0
that the perspective is the listener’s (Lydia) and the
world is the one in which Lydia is in Northampton.
Although decreasing in probability as perspec-
tive cost increases, the listener perspective remains
possible for all sentences but You are coming to
Northampton, where the listener perspective is elim-
inated because she is in motion. In this case, the
speaker perspective is inferred with probability 1.0.
For a third-party mover, the listener perspective is
as likely as the speaker perspective only when the
perspective cost for non-speakers is set to zero. As
the speaker cost increases, the listener perspective
becomes proportionally less likely (Fig. 3).
For the go sentences, both perspectives are always
valid possibilities, since go does not have a perspec-
tival component. For these sentences, the likelihood
of the speaker perspective increases proportionally
as the speaker cost is increased (Fig. 5).
Although the perspective cost parameter can be
used to explore whether there is a processing cost
for adopting non-speaker perspectives, since the cost
is part of the listener’s model of the speaker, it can
also be used to explore the listener’s beliefs about
the speaker. If the listener believes that a particular
speaker is more or less likely to adopt non-speaker
perspectives, the listener may adjust the perspec-
tive cost parameter accordingly (for instance, if the
speaker has higher rank than the listener; or limited
knowledge of the listener’s location).
5.3 Marginal inference
As mentioned above, one novel claim of our model
is that listeners consider multiple perspectives at
once when they interpret utterances. This contrasts
with proposals that the default perspective holder is
the speaker (Roberts, 2015), or that listeners process
sentences using the most recent perspective, as Har-
ris’s Maintain Perspective proposal posits (2012).
Harris’s Maintain Perspective principle is moti-
vated by evidence that perspective shift is cogni-
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Figure 3: Model predictions for Thera is coming to Northampton at varying levels of speaker cost.
Speaker Listener Marginal
Both in Noho: 0.26 0.24 0.5
Neither in Noho: 0 0 0
Listener in Noho: 0 0.24 0.24
Speaker in Noho: 0.26 0 0.26
Figure 4: Non-zero posterior probabilities for Thera is coming
to Northampton, speaker cost = 0.5
tively difficult and incurs a high processing cost.
He posits that listeners avoid perspective shift by
processing a sentence with the last-used perspec-
tive, and only shifting perspective when motivated
by sufficient contextual evidence (2012).
By contrast, our proposal posits that listeners are
always weighing multiple perspectives, and that they
calculate the meaning of the sentence relative to
each perspective as they interpret the sentence. Con-
sidering multiple perspectives leads to a different
marginal distribution over worlds than if the listener
tracks just one perspective at a time.
To see this, consider the model’s predictions for
Thera is coming to Northampton when speaker cost
is 0.5 (Fig. 4).The marginal distribution favors the
world where both the speaker and listener are lo-
cated at the destination. Although we present Fig.
4 as an example, this is true regardless of the param-
eter settings, so long as there is a non-zero chance
that the listener is the perspective holder.
On the other hand, if the listener interprets the
sentence relative to just one perspective (say, the
speaker’s), she would have no reason to prefer the
world in which both the speaker and listener are
at the destination over the world in which just the
speaker is there (assuming other contextual factors,
like the plausibility of conversations taking place
between two people in the same location, are held
steady). All worlds in which the speaker is located
at the destination would be equally likely.
In this way, the ‘multiple perspectives’ hypoth-
esis predicts that listeners will prefer to interpret
Thera is coming to Northampton as conveying a
message that is true for all salient perspectives; mod-
els that pick a single perspective to interpret the sen-
tence do not. We plan to test this in an experi-
ment where speakers are presented with perspecti-
val sentences like Thera is coming to Northampton
and non-perspectival equivalents like Thera is driv-
ing to Northampton6, and are asked to choose the
most likely scenario for each sentence from a set
of pictures. If listeners perform the kind of prag-
matic inference that we propose, they should prefer
the world in which both possible perspective holders
are at the destination in the perspectival condition.
6 Conclusion
We have outlined an extension to the Rational
Speech Acts model in which the listener jointly rea-
sons about the likelihood of the speaker’s utterance
and the adopted perspective. This model provides a
framework for exploring the effects of various cost
functions, priors, and lexical semantics for perspec-
6In order to control for the possibility that situations where
the speaker and the listener are together may be more likely.
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Figure 5: Model predictions for go sentences at varying levels of speaker cost.
tival items. We have described some of the predic-
tions that our model makes for one kind of perspec-
tival expression, perspectival motion verbs; we hope
the model that we have outlined can serve as a useful
framework for generating testable predictions about
other kinds of perspectival expressions as well.
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